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PRISON TIME, FINES, AND FEDERAL
WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS: THE
ANATOMY OF A RACIAL DISPARITY
MAX SCHANZENBACH* & MICHAEL L. YAEGER**
1. INTRODUCTION

Do criminals of different races, sexes, or socio-economic status receive
different sentences? If so, why? For decades, these have been among the
predominant questions in the academic and political discussion of
sentencing. There was at least one study of sentencing disparity conducted
in the 1920s,l and many other studies were undertaken over the next six
decades.2 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines (the "Federal Guidelines" or
the "Guidelines") arose in part from a desire to eliminate unwarranted
sentencing disparity between judges,3 and the focus on disparity has not

* Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
Michael Yaeger is an attorney with the law firm of Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP in
New York City. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the position
of his firm or of the clients of the firm, and should not be imputed to them.
I See Thorsten Sellin, The Negro Criminal: A StatisticalNote, 140 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. Sci. 52 (1928).
2 See John Hagan, Extra-Legal Attributes and Criminal Sentencing: An
Assessment of a
Sociological Viewpoint, 8 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 357 (1974) (surveying the literature); see also
DOROTHY CAMPBELL TOMPKINS, SENTENCING THE OFFENDER-A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1971)
(same); Edward Green, Research on Disparities,in THE CRIMINAL INTHE ARMS OF THE LAW
529 (Leon Radzinowicz & Marvin E. Wolfgang eds., 1971) (same); Andrew Overby,
DiscriminationAgainst Minority Groups, in THE CRIMINAL IN THE ARMS OF THE LAW 569
(same); Gary Kleck, Racial Discriminationin CriminalSentencing: A CriticalEvaluation of
the Evidence with Additional Evidence on the Death Penalty, 46 AM. Soc. REv. 783 (1981)
(same).
3 See KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS 38-77, 104, and accompanying notes (1998).
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abated since the Guidelines took effect in 1987.4 Indeed, the recent
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker,5 which arguably grants
greater discretion to district courts in criminal sentencing by making the
Guidelines "advisory," will heighten interest in disparity.
We examine racial disparities in white collar criminal sentencing using
a large dataset provided by the United States Sentencing Commission. We
also discuss sex disparities at some length, in part because they provide an
interesting contrast to racial disparities. We focus on white collar crimes
(non-violent, economic crimes) for several reasons. First, it is perhaps
surprising that racial disparities persist for such crimes, which would not
appear to be as racially tinged as those involving violence or drug
trafficking. Second, the presence of significant alternative punishments,
such as fines, leaves more room for judicial discretion than in the case of
more serious crimes. Finally, there are fewer sources of disparity in white
collar crimes. For example, in the case of drug crimes, legislatures make
distinctions between crack and powder cocaine and mandate minimum
sentences.6 In addition, the crimes are likely reported in different ways:
drug traffickers are likely caught in sting operations, whereas those who
commit fraud or embezzlement are likely more often sought after due to
victim complaints.
We find large racial disparities using standard regression techniques.
In other words, when controlling for as many relevant characteristics as
possible, blacks and Hispanics receive longer prison sentences than whites.
This is consistent with previous studies. However, careful consideration of
the nature of white collar crimes reveals that a large portion (up to onethird) of the estimated disparity is driven by the ability to pay a fine.
Similarly, income is also shown to be an important factor, and it is poorly
measured in the data. In addition, we find that the calculation of the
Guideline's sentencing range may actually work in favor of minorities, and
determining the sentencing range is one of the most important elements of
Guideline's sentencing scheme. Our results call into question traditional
studies of sentencing disparities, and we conclude that the estimation of
racial disparities, even under a determinant sentencing framework like the
Guidelines, is more complicated than previous work indicates.

4 See Sentencing Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
5 125 S.Ct. 738, 767 (2005).

trigger mandatory minimum drug sentences, powdered cocaine trafficked must be
one hundred times that of crack. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii)-(B)(iii) (2000). For a
6 To

discussion and critique, see Albert Alschler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical
Failureof the FederalGuidelines, 58 STAN. L. REv. 85, 102-04 (2005).
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This Paper is organized as follows: Part II discusses how prison
sentences and fines are calculated under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Part III discusses the empirical and theoretical literature on fines and whitecollar sentencing. Part IV discusses the data and the methodology of our
study with a particular focus on the problems of identifying racial bias
empirically. Part V describes and interprets the results of our study. Part
VI concludes.
II. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES
For most of American history, federal district court judges had vast
discretion over sentencing. Some statutes prescribed a maximum fine or
time of imprisonment for a particular crime, and a handful prescribed
minimums. Otherwise, trial judges were basically free to impose the
sentences they thought appropriate. The law gave them almost no guidance
in the exercise of their discretion, and their judgments were virtually never
subject to appellate review.
All of this changed when Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984.8 The law established the Sentencing Commission, a bipartisan,
independent agency within the judicial branch, and charged it with
"promulgating detailed guidelines prescribing the appropriate sentences for
[federal] offenders." 9 The Sentencing Act also "direct[ed] the Commission
to periodically review and revise the Guidelines" and "authorize[ed] the
Commission to submit amendments to Congress."' Accordingly, from the
time the Guidelines took effect on November 1, 1987 until the Booker
decision, sentencing in federal courts has been controlled by a
comprehensive set of rules created by an administrative agency. Prior to
Booker, the Guidelines were mandatory and were treated as such by the
Except for special circumstances in which "departures" are
courts.'
authorized, a trial judge must sentence a criminal in accordance with the

7 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 9-11. The structure and language of our
description of the Sentencing Guidelines owes much to Stith and Cabranes's book and to an
essay by Frank Bowman. See Frank 0. Bowman, III, The 2001 Federal Economic Crime
Sentencing Reforms: An Analysis andLegislative History, 35 IND. L. REV. 5 (2001).
8 See Sentencing Reform Act.

9 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(l)(b) (2000). For a brief description of the Commission's
composition, see Ami L. Feinstein et al., Eighth Survey of White Collar Crime Procedural
Issues: FederalSentencing, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (1983).
10 Feinstein et al., supra note 9, at 1083 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994 (o), (p)(1980)).
1128 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000) (invalidatedby United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 74546 (2005)).
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Guidelines or risk a reversal on appellate review. 12 Booker, discussed in
greater detail below, made the Guidelines "advisory" but still requires
district court judges to consult them.
A. PRISON SENTENCES UNDER THE GUIDELINES
Although complex in application, the Guidelines are fairly
straightforward in theory.
As one commentator has observed, the
Guidelines can be understood as "nothing
more than a set of instructions for
13
one chart - the Sentencing Table."'
Under the Guidelines, a defendant is sentenced by determining in
which of the 258 boxes of the Table he or she belongs. 14 A judge uses the
Guidelines to calculate the defendant's "offense level," a figure intended to
measure the gravity of the crime currently, and the defendant's "criminal
history category," a figure intended to measure the gravity of the offender's
past criminal conduct. The offense level is the position on the vertical or yaxis of the grid (expressed in Arabic numerals), and the criminal history
category is the position on the horizontal or x-axis of the grid (expressed in
Roman numerals). The intercept of the two factors provides a sentencing
range expressed in months. For example, a defendant with an offense level
of 9 and a criminal history category of I can be sentenced from four to ten
months. Because all sentences are expressed on the chart in terms of
months of imprisonment, sentences consisting solely of probation, fines, or
non-prison confinement (the latter category includes house arrest and time
in a "half way house") are denoted as sentences of "0" months. This range
is the area in which a judge has absolute discretion. If a judge has properly
calculated the offense level and criminal history, a sentence within this
range is unreviewable. 5
1. Offense Level Calculations
A defendant's offense level is comprised of several elements: (1) the
points assigned to the specific statutory violation at issue (also called the
base offense level);16 (2) adjustments to the base offense level that reflect
relevant conduct specific to the crime of conviction ("relevant conduct" is a
12

A sentence within a properly calculated Guidelines range is not reversible. 18 U.S.C.

§ 3742 (2000).
13 See supra note 7, at 9.
14 See infra Appendix 1.
15 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
16 Base offense levels are specified in the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual,
Chapter Two--Offense Conduct. For example, price fixing has a base offense level of 10.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2R1.l(a) (2006).
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term of art under the Guidelines and can include size of the loss, other
crimes committed by the defendant, and even other crimes committed by
his accomplices); 17 and (3) the points assigned to general offense
such as the offender
adjustments that apply equally to all offense
8 categories,
played an aggravating role in the offense.'
The points assigned to the specific statutory violation at issue take two
forms: the "base offense level" of the crime, meaning the amount of points
the commission assigned to conviction for a particular statutory violation,
and the "specific offense characteristics" of the crime, meaning the
particular aspects of a crime that make it more or less blameworthy than
other violations of the same statute.1 9 Examples of specific offense
characteristics include the amount of money stolen in a fraud and the
amount of violence involved in the course of a robbery. 20 So far, then, the
system appears relatively simple in application as well as theory: Every
criminal who commits a robbery receives the base level of points, and those
who commit an especially violent robbery receive additional points for
specific offense characteristics. However, the precise number of special
points given for specific offense conduct depends not only upon the
conduct-such as possessing a weapon-but also upon the underlying
statutory crime. For example, a robber receives five extra points for
possessing a firearm, while a drug trafficker receives just two points for
possessing any dangerous weapon (including a firearm). 2'
As noted above, "relevant conduct" can include other crimes by the
defendant and other crimes committed by his accomplices. A court is
supposed to take "relevant conduct" into effect if it is proved by a
"preponderance of the evidence" (a lower standard than "beyond a
reasonable doubt") at the sentencing hearing, irrespective of whether the
defendant had been charged with the conduct in the indictment. A judge is

17

These are often called "Specific Offense Characteristics" and are specified for each

crime in Chapter Two of the Guidelines Manual. For example, price-fixing has a base
offense level of 10, but adjustments are made based on the "value of commerce" affected.
See id. § 2R1. l(b)(2). For a discussion, see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 70.
18 These are detailed in the Guidelines Manual, Chapter Three-Adjustments.
For
example, if the judge at the sentencing hearing finds that the offender played an "aggravating
role" in the offense, the offense level may be increased by as much as four levels. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1(a).
19 See supra, notes 15-16.
20 Bowman, supra note 13, at 10.
21 STI H & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 68 n.199 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL §§ 2B3.1(G)(2) (1996), 2Dl.l(b)(1) (1996)).

MAX SCHANZENBA CH & MICHAEL L. YAEGER

[Vol. 96

even supposed to consider some "relevant conduct" if that conduct
underlies charges for which a defendant has been acquitted.2 2
General offense adjustments are applied for aspects of crimes that are
not confined to particular statutory violations. Moreover, while the number
of points allotted for specific offense characteristics varies depending on the
underlying statutory violation, general offense adjustments carry the same
weight regardless of the underlying statutory violation. For example, the
"vulnerable victim" adjustment is applied for all crimes in which the
defendant knew or should have known that the victim was unusually
vulnerable due to his age, mental condition, or physical condition; and in all
crimes it raises the base offense level by two points.23
2. CriminalHistory Calculations
Criminal history calculations are somewhat more straightforward than
offense level calculations. Defendants are assigned criminal history points
on the basis of their nominal sentence length, not actual time served, and
irrespective of how long ago a conviction occurred. It is also irrelevant
whether a defendant's previous conviction has any relation to her current
offense. Thus, as Professor Kate Stith and Judge Jose Cabranes note, "a
defendant convicted of white collar fraud who recently served a short prison
sentence for a previous fraudulent scheme receives the same criminal
history enhancement as does the white' 24collar defendant who ten years ago
served a sentence for drug possession.
3. Departuresfrom the Guidelines
In most cases a judge must sentence a defendant within the applicable
range of the Sentencing Table. However, a judge is authorized to "depart"
from the Sentencing Table if, in the words of the Sentencing Reform Act
and the Guidelines, "there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance
of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines. '' 25 Given the
comprehensive nature of the Guidelines, this standard weighs against
departures. Moreover, a decision to depart can be appealed to a higher

22

See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (conduct underlying charges for

which defendant has been acquitted may be relied on in sentencing); U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § LB 1.3 cmt..

23 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3AL.l(b).
24 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 72.

25 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
statement.

§ 5K2.0 policy
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court, whereas a decision not to depart cannot be appealed.2 6 The basic
result of the current system is that departures in general are discouraged and
downward departures are especially discouraged.2 7 When they occur, it is
most downward departures
usually at the prosecutor's prompting. 2 8 That is,
that the prosecutor
meaning
assistance,"
are usually given for "substantial
has recommended that the defendant's sentence be reduced because the
defendant has substantially assisted in the prosecution of another
individual.2 9
4. United States v. Booker
On January 12, 2005, the Supreme Court held in United States v.
Booker that the provisions of the Federal Sentencing Act that made the
Guidelines binding violated the Sixth Amendment. 30 Despite the severance
of the binding provisions, however, the Guidelines remain important. First,
the data on Guidelines-era sentences collected by the United States
Sentencing Commission (the "Sentencing Commission" or the
"Commission") is the richest source of information we have on federal
sentences in any era. Second, Booker itself provides that "[t]he district
courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those
Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing. ' 31 Exactly what
"consult" means in the context of the Booker and the Guidelines is not yet
clear,32 but at a minimum the Guidelines will probably serve as a sort of
treatise or Restatement of Sentencing.3 3 Under Booker, the circuit court

26

The judge's mechanical calculation of offense level and criminal history category can

be appealed even when the sentence is within the Guidelines. 18 U.S.C § 3772.
27 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 72-77, for a general discussion of departures
under the Guidelines.

28 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING

108-21) iv-v (2003), available
at http://www.ussc.gov/departrpt03/departrpt03.pdf (noting that recently the government
initiates 40% of non-substantial assistance downward departures). Substantial assistance
departures have also become increasingly common, and in 2003 outpaced non-substantial
assistance departures. Id. at 32 tbl. 1.
29 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).
30 United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738, 767 (2005).
31 Id. at 767.
32 Compare United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005), and United
GUIDELINES (IN RESPONSE TO SECTION 401 (M) OF PUBLIC LAW

States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. Utah 2005), with United States v. Ranum, 353 F.
Supp. 2d 984 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
33 Cf United States v. Mueffelman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79, 96 (D. Mass 2004) (holding the
Guidelines unconstitutional after the Supreme Court issued Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.
Ct. 2531 (2004), but before it issued Booker):
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likewise relies on the existing guidelines to review the "reasonableness" of
the district court's sentence.34
How these changes affect sentencing will not be clear for some time,
and important questions remain unanswered. For example, do the circuit
courts now review departures with greater deference than before? What is a
reasonable sentence? Do the Guidelines ranges still represent a safe harbor
for sentencing judges? When, as now, the entire legal community is
considering wide-ranging reforms and reevaluating the sentencing regime at
the federal and state levels, it is especially important that we understand
what the actual effects of the Guidelines have been.
B. FINES UNDER THE GUIDELINES
The Guidelines specify that a court must impose a fine in all cases,
"except where the defendant establishes that he is unable to pay and is not
likely to become able to pay any fine." 35 In determining the amount of the
fine, a judge is expressly directed to consider "the burden that the fine
places on the defendant and his dependents relative to alternative
punishments" 36 and "any ...pertinent equitable considerations. ' 37 In the
case of fines, then, the court is not only permitted to consider the personal
characteristics of a defendant, but is commanded to consider them. The
Sentencing Commission's usual fear of disparity is muted. In addition,
even if a large fine is imposed, judges are required to apply the Sentencing
Guidelines for prison time as they would have otherwise.3 8

[T]here will never be a return to truly indeterminate sentencing. The Guidelines have
dramatically changed the way judges and parties think about sentencing; it has created
a common vocabulary in terms of which we can compare cases and like or unlike
defendants. I, along with all of the other judges who have declared the Guidelines as
a whole unconstitutional under Blakely, will recognize and surely be guided by their
provisions.
Id.
34 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 770.
35 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
36

Id.§ 5E1.2(d)(3).

37

Id. § 5E1.2(d)(8).

§ 5E1.2(a) (2006).

There is nothing permitting a departure from the Guidelines on the basis of payment of
a fine or an adjustment in the offense level to reflect fine payment. However, the Guidelines
provide that fines should be imposed in a manner such that the "combined sentence" reflects
the seriousness of the offense. Id.§ 5E1.2(d)(1). Of course, the judge retains discretion
within the confines of calculating the offense level and sentencing within the range.
38
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If a defendant is ordered to pay a fine, that fine is calculated by
reference to the Fine Table found at Section 5E1.2(c)(3) of the Sentencing
Guidelines (Figure 1).
Figure 1
Guidelinesfor Fines
§5E1.2.

Fines for Individual Defendants
(a) The court shall impose a fine in all cases, except where the
defendant establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely
to become able to pay any fine.
(b) The applicable fine guideline range is that specified in
subsection (c) below. If, however, the fuideline for the
offense in Chapter Two provides a specific rule for imposing
a fine, that rule takes precedence over subsection (c) of this
section.
(c) (1) The minimum of the fine guideline range is the amount
shown in column A of the table below.
(2) Except as specified in (4) below, the maximum of the
fine guideline range is the amount shown in column B of
the table below.
(3)
Fine Table
Offense
A
B
Level
Minimum
Maximum
3 and below
4-5
6-7
8-9
10-11
12-13
14-15
16-17
18-19
20-22
23-25
26-28
29-31
32-34
35-37
38 and above

$100
$250
$500
$1,000
$2,000
$3,000
$4,000
$5,000
$6,000
$7,500
$10,000
$12,500
$15,000
$17,500
$20,000
$25,000

$5,000
$5,000
$5,000
$10,000
$20,000
$30,000
$40,000
$50,000
$60,000
$75,000
$100,000
$125,000
$150,000
$175,000
$200,000
$250,000
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The Fine Table is trumped only when "the defendant is convicted
under a statute authorizing (a) a maximum fine greater than $250,000, or (b)
a fine for each day of violation." 39 In those cases a court "may impose a
fine up to the maximum authorized by statute. 4 0 The range of fines in each
cell of the Fine Table is remarkably broad. For example, the fine range for
an offense level of 4 to 5 is between $250 and $5,000, and the fine range for
an offense level of 18 to 19 is between $6,000 and $60,000. In general, the
sentencing judge assesses fines after the probation officer (an officer of the
court who advises the judge on the appropriate level of sentence)
investigates the offender's financial situation. 41 Fines can also be
incorporated into a plea bargain.
C. SENTENCING DISPARITIES AND THE GUIDELINES
The Guidelines were implemented primarily to reduce unwarranted
sentencing disparities.
However, post-Guidelines studies find that
irrelevant factors such as race and sex continue to affect sentencing. David
Mustard conducted one of the most comprehensive studies of sentencing
under the Guidelines.4 2 Mustard found that unexplained race, sex, and
income disparities in length of prison sentence exist even after accounting
for an offender's position in the Guidelines sentencing grid (explained in
greater detail below), offense type, education, and age.43 While Mustard
found that much of the racial disparity was due to departures from the
Guidelines, he found that blacks sentenced under the Guidelines still had an
average prison sentence more than two months longer than similarly
situated whites.4 4 In addition to studying the length of sentence, Mustard
also found that (1) whites were more likely to receive a sentence of no
prison term than similarly situated blacks and Hispanics, and that (2) they
were also more likely to receive a downward departure. Women fared
better than men in all specifications.
Apart from Mustard, a number of other post-Guideline studies have
also found racial disparities. Celesta Albonetti, examining only drug

" Id. § 5E1.2(c)(4).
40 Id.

41 The Guidelines authorize the judge to consider the ability to pay a fine and the impact

of a fine on the offender's dependents and ability to pay restitution. See generally 18 U.S.C.

§ 3572 (2000).

42 David B. Mustard, Racial, Ethnic, and Sex Disparities in Sentencing: Evidence from
the U.S. FederalCourts, 44 J.L. & ECON. 285 (2001).
43 Id. at 299-305. This disparity was present for nearly all types of offenses, but ranged
from almost 10.5 months for drug trafficking to 0.91 months for fraud. Id. at 306 tbl.8.
44 Id. at 297 tbl.6.
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offenders in 1991-92, found that blacks, men, and those with lower
educations received longer sentences.45 Douglas McDonald and Kenneth
Carlson concluded that disparities between blacks and whites increased
after the Guidelines, but that these differences were largely due to the
policy choices of the Sentencing Commission, not the biases of prosecutors
or judges.4 6 This finding, of course, is in contrast to Mustard's later
conclusion that most of the disparity between blacks and whites was due
not to the policy choices embedded in the Guidelines, but to departures
from the Commission's strictures.4 7
While important, these studies fail to identify the source of the
sentencing disparity. A racial disparity could arise because of prejudiced
prosecutors and judges, but other sources are possible as well. For
example, wealth, quality of legal counsel, and the seriousness of the crime
may not be fully controlled for and these factors may be correlated with
race. To directly address whether judges are at the root of racial disparities,
Schanzenbach examined whether racial disparities were correlated with
judicial characteristics. 4 8 He was unable to identify the actual sentencing
judge, so his study used variation in the percent Democrats, black,
Hispanic, and female judges at the district level.49 He found no consistent
correlations between any of these judicial characteristics and racial
that judges are the primary
disparities, and concluded that it is unlikely
50
cause of racial disparities in sentencing.
In addition to racial disparities, the literature has also focused on interjudge disparities: in other words, how much do individual judges matter?
The literature is divided as to whether inter-judge disparities increased or
decreased after the Guidelines. Hofer et al. have argued that the Guidelines
decreased inter-judge sentence disparities. 5 1 Anderson et al. found a
45 Celesta A. Albonetti, Sentencing under the FederalSentencing Guidelines: Effects of
Defendant Characteristics,Guilty Pleas, and Departures on Sentence Outcomes for Drug
Offenses, 1991-1992, 31 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 789, 817 (1997).
46 DOUGLAS C. MCDONALD & KENNETH E. CARLSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
SENTENCING IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RACE MATTER?

47 Mustard, supra note 42, at 311-12.

177 (1993).

Max Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The Effect of
District-LevelJudicialDemographics,24 J. LEGAL STUD. 57 (2005).
49 Id. at 65.
50 There were some differences within particular crime categories.
For example,
Schanzenbach found that black white-collar offenders were sentenced more lightly in
districts with more black judges. There was some evidence that having more Hispanic
judges reduced sentences for black and Hispanic drug offenders, but no similar effect was
found for having more black judges. Id. at 80-81.
51 Paul J. Hofer et al., The Effect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on Inter-judge
Sentencing Disparity,90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 239, 240 (1999).
48
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decrease in inter-judge disparities in sentence length after the Guidelines,
yet argued that the advent of mandatory minimum sentences for drug
offenses might have contributed to the decline.52 On the other hand,
Lacasse and Payne found that the Guidelines made no difference. In a
unique approach, they measured inter-judge disparity by examining whether
plea bargains changed after the Guidelines. 53 If inter-judge disparities truly
decreased under Guidelines, Lacasse and Payne reasoned, the judge
assigned to a case should have less influence on the decision to plea and on
the substance of the plea agreement than she did before. 54 Yet Lacasse and
Payne found the contrary: the judge assigned to a case influenced plea
decisions as much after the Guidelines as before. 55 Schanzenbach and
Tiller have recently shown that Democrats give lighter sentences than
Republicans in the case of violent and drug crimes, and that these
differences increase when circuit courts are aligned (in other words,
Democrats in a Democratic circuit give lower sentences than Democrats in
a Republican circuit).56 These findings, taken together, are consistent with
the notion that judges still have substantial discretion under the Sentencing
Guidelines.
Our paper contributes to the disparity literature by examining racial
disparities in the sentencing of white-collar criminals.
Despite the
abundance of disparity studies since the Guidelines were enacted, none
have focused on white-collar crime in particular.
Those studies that have examined white-collar crime have merely
included it in a larger study without detailed comment or investigation.
This is a significant gap in the literature because white-collar crime has a
few traits that make it an especially fertile source of insight into sentencing.
First, because fines are used against those who are convicted of whitecollar crime more often than those who are convicted of violent crimes,
drug crimes, or immigration crimes, white-collar crime offers an
opportunity to examine the use of fines and their effect on prison sentence
disparities. This feature of white-collar crime is especially pertinent

52 James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity: Before and

After the FederalSentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271, 273 (1999).
53 Chantale Lacasse & A. Abigail Payne, FederalSentencing Guidelines and Mandatory

Minimum Sentences: Do Defendants Bargain in the Shadow of the Judge?, 42 J.L. & ECON.
245 (1999).
54 Id. at 247-50.
55 Id. at 267-68.
56 Max Schanzenbach & Emerson Tiller, Strategic Judging under the Sentencing
Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming
spring 2007).
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because law and economics57scholars have championed fines as a cheaper
alternative to imprisonment.
Second, some notable empirical work on federal sentencing before the
Guidelines has focused on white-collar crime. 58 White-collar crime
therefore provides a place for comparison between the pre- and postGuidelines world.
Third, if there is disparity in the sentencing of white-collar crime, bias
might be more plausibly ascribed to judges or prosecutors than in other
types of crimes. Legislators and police have not exercised as much
influence over white-collar crime as they do over other types of crime,
leaving prosecutors and judges with more discretion.5 9 Anti-drug criminal
57 The seminal article is Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 193 (1968) (contending that "social welfare is increased if
fines are used whenever feasible"). For a concise overview, see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 7.2 (5th ed. 1998).
58 The most influential studies-and justly so-are probably those conducted under the
direction of Stanton Wheeler and published in book form as the Yale Studies on WhiteCollar Crime. The quantitative work is published in various books and articles (the articles
being essentially preliminary findings), including DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., WHITE-COLLAR
CRIME AND CRIMINAL CAREERS (2001); DAVID WEISBURD ET AL., CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE
CLASSES: WHITE-COLLAR OFFENDERS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (1991) [hereinafter WEISBURD
ET AL., CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES]; David Weisburd et al., Class, Status and the
Punishment of White-Collar Criminals, 15 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 223 (1990); Stanton
Wheeler et al., White Collar Crimes and Criminals,25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 331 (1988); and
Stanton Wheeler et al., Sentencing the White-Collar Offender: Rhetoric and Reality, 47 AM.
Soc. REV.641 (1982) [hereinafter Wheeler et al., Sentencing the White-Collar Offender]. In
addition to their quantitative work, the Yale researchers also published three other books, the
most pertinent to this Paper being STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE
SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS (1988), which summarizes and discusses
extensive interviews of federal district court judges. Other researchers (that is, researchers
outside the Yale project) have also conducted useful quantitative studies. See, e.g., Michael
L. Benson & Esteban Walker, Sentencing the White-Collar Offender, 53 AM. SOC. REV. 294
(1988) (in-depth study of a single federal district court in a Midwestern state); John Hagan &
Ilene Nagel, The DifferentialSentencing of White Collar Offenders in Ten FederalDistrict
Courts, 45 AM. Soc. REV. 802 (1980); John Hagan & Patricia Parker, White-Collar Crime
and Punishment: The ClassStructure and Legal Sanctioningof Securities Violations, 50 AM.
SOC. REV. 302 (1985) (examining securities violations in Canada); Ilene H. Nagel & John
Hagan, The Sentencing of White-Collar Criminals in Federal Courts: A Socio-legal
Exploration of Disparity,80 MICH. L. REV. 1427 (1982); Ilene H. Nagel & John L. Hagan,
White-Collar Crime, White-Collar Time: The Sentencing of White-Collar Offenders in the
Southern Districtof New York, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 259 (1982).
59 For example, there are no mandatory minimum sentences in the case of federal white
collar crimes, but mandatory minimums are common in drug crimes. For a discussion of
how this may contribute to disparity between crimes post-Booker, see M.K.B. Darmer, The
Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Blakely and Booker: The Limits of Congressional
Tolerance and a Greater Role for Juries, 56 S.C. L. REV. 533, 565 (2005). Post-Enron,
Congress has shown a greater willingness to tinker with white collar crime. See Sarbanes-
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law provides an illustrative contrast. Defendants sentenced for possessing
or trafficking in crack cocaine are disproportionately black, 60 and
possession and distribution of crack is punished much more severely than
possession and distribution of powdered cocaine. 61 There is no obvious
legislative thumb on the scale creating this kind of racial disparity in whitecollar crime. Likewise, because credit card, bank, and securities fraud are
likely to be reported by victims or institutions instead of resulting from
sting operations, police may exert less control over the investigations and
arrests of white-collar criminals than they do violent criminals or drug
criminals. Investigations and arrests of white-collar criminals spring from
victim complaints more often than from beat-cop observations, and
complaints may be investigated by prosecutors before the police ever make
an arrest. 62 In fact, the complaints may be made directly to prosecutors,

bypassing the police entirely until the prosecutors decide they have enough
evidence to make an arrest, and only then do the police show up and arrest
the fraudster.6 a
III. PREVIOUS WORK ON FINES AND PRISON TIME
There is a large amount of theoretical literature on fines, particularly
on optimal fines and the trade-off between prison and fines.64 The

Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, §§ 902-06, 116 Stat. 745 (enhancing penalties for white
collar crime); § 805 (directing the Commission to amend the Guidelines to ensure that the
punishments for obstruction of justice are "sufficient to deter and punish that activity").
These amendments are not covered by the time span of the sample.
60 See Carol A. Bergman, The Politics of Federal Sentencing on Cocaine, 10 FED.
SENT'G REP. 196, 196 (1998) ("In 1993, 88.3 percent of those sentenced for trafficking crack
were African American; 4.1 percent were white.").
61 For example, "a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence is triggered by trafficking fifty
grams of crack, but one must traffic five thousand grams of powder cocaine to trigger the
same sentence." Id.
62 WEISBURD ET AL., CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES, supra note 58, at 97 thl.5.1. The
data are from the 1980s, but conform to common intuition: fraud and embezzlement cases
are usually detected because of reports by victims or employers (with securities fraud being
an exception). Id. In fact, victim/employer complaints or "routine audits or investigations"
detect nearly 80% of white collar crimes prosecuted. Id.
63 Some white-collar crimes, however, such as tax crimes, might resemble street crime in
that they are initially investigated by tax officials who are not prosecutors and are therefore
only selectively referred for prosecution. These types of white collar-crime therefore
resemble street crime in that they have another level where bias can creep in.
64 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 57, at 244-48; James Andreoni, Reasonable Doubt and
the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?, 22 RAND J. ECON. 285
(1991); David D. Friedman, Reflections on Optimal Punishment; or, Should the Rich Pay
Higher Fines?, 3 REv. L. & EcON. 185 (198 1); Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Probabilityand
Magnitude of Fines for Acts that Definitely Are Undesirable, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 3
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theoretical literature goes far beyond the scope of this paper. There is,
however, an important argument from the law and economics literature that
fines are an underused form of punishment.65 If a defendant is not
judgment-proof, fines are a comparatively inexpensive way to deter and
punish because imprisonment, the most likely alternative, is so costly to
society. This may lead to inequitable prison sentences between rich and
poor, but, the argument goes, so long as fines are severe enough, the actual
level of punishment should be equated. We consider the relevance of this
argument in greater detail when we discuss our results.
We are aware of three detailed quantitative 66 studies on fines and
imprisonment in the United States, all of which examine only preGuidelines cases. Joel Waldfogel used pre-Guidelines sentencing data to
determine whether or not judges traded prison time for fines in white-collar
He concluded that there was strong evidence that courts (or
cases.
possibly prosecutors in plea bargains) "traded" fines for prison time,
(1992); Steven. D. Levitt, Incentive CompatibilityConstraintsas an Explanationfor the Use
of Prison Sentences Instead of Fines, 17 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 179 (1997); John R. Lott,
Should the Wealthy Be Able to "Buy Justice"?, 95 J. POL. ECON. 1307 (1987); A. Mitchell &
Daniel Rubinfeld, A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders, 46 J. PUB. EcON. 291
(1991); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth
Varies Among Individuals, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 618 (1991); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM.
ECON. REV. 880 (1979); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines
and Imprisonment, 24 J. PUB. EcON. 89 (1984); Steven Shavell, Specific Versus General
Enforcement of Law, 99 J. POL. ECON. 1088 (1991); George Stigler, The Optimum
Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970); cf Becker, supra note 57, at 169
(developing a "market model" of crime); Isaac Ehrlich, Crime, Punishment, and the Market
for Offenses, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 43 (1996) (same, with a useful bibliography on economic
models of crime); Ann D. Witte, Estimating the Economic Model of Crime with Individual
Data,94 Q. J. ECON. 57 (1980) (same).
65 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 57, at 244-48 (suggesting that the best way to get
convicts to pay fines is to impose heavy non-pecuniary sanctions as alternatives).
66 We found a fourth study which could be described as empirical, but not quantitative:
SALLY T. HILLSMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINES IN SENTENCING: A STUDY OF THE
USE OF THE FINE AS A CRIMINAL SANCTION (1984). Hillsman and her colleagues provide

valuable information on sentencing practices in the federal and state courts, as well as courts
of foreign jurisdiction. They present the state of the law as captured in statutes and case law,
and they also researched ongoing practice by conducting "a national telephone survey of one
hundred twenty-six courts in twenty-one states; on-site visits to thirty eight courts of various
types in seven states; and an in-depth, case record study of fine use and collection in New
York City's five limited and five general jurisdiction courts." Id. at 10. However, Hillsman
and her colleagues did not analyze disparities in race, socio-economic class, or sex, or
conduct much quantitative research beyond tallying fine amounts. Although the study is
related to the questions posed in this Article, it is not directly responsive.
67 Joel Waldfogel, Are Fines and Prison Terms Used Efficiently? Evidence on Federal
FraudOffenders, 39 J.L. & ECON. 107 (1995).
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particularly for wealthier defendants. When defendants were poorer, judges
imposed a mix of fines and imprisonment. As part of the Yale studies on
white collar crime, David Weisburd, Stanton Wheeler, Elin Waring and
Nancy Bode also studied pre-Guidelines sentencing data, and while their
study did not consider whether fines were traded for prison time, they did
find that fines depend on net worth, which is consistent with Waldfogel's
result.68 John Lott, in another pre-Guidelines study, also found that fines
correlate to income. Lott did not, however, find a significant relationship
Waldfogel suggests that this
between income and prison terms.6 9
discrepancy between his study and Lott's may be due to Lott's much
smaller sample size.7 °
It is possible, however, that the Guidelines have changed some of the
conditions Waldfogel observed. Specifically, they seem to have reduced
the ability of judges to impose fines in lieu of imprisonment-in at least
three ways. First, the Guidelines do not permit judges to use fines as an
independent sanction unless a defendant is in "Zone A" of the Sentencing
Table.71 In all other cases fines must be coupled with some form of
detention. Second, fines do not justify departures from the Guidelines,
although judges still have some sentencing room within the Guidelines.
Third, the Guidelines increased the mandatory prison sentences for whitecollar crimes, and departures from these sentences are subject to appellate
review.
IV. DATA AND METHOD

A. THE DATA
The data used are collected and maintained by the Office of Policy
Analysis of the Sentencing Commission. 72 The judicial terms 1992-93
through 2000-2001 are examined. Earlier judicial terms are not used
because they contain a large number of pre-Guidelines cases. In this period

68 WEISBURD ET AL., CRIMES OF THE MIDDLE CLASSES, supra note

58, at 150-57

(discussing the fines results and observing that "[t~hose with the most money available are
most likely to be fined").
69 John R. Lott, Do We Punish High Income Criminals Too Heavily?, 30 ECoN. INQUIRY
583 (1992).
70 Waldfogel, supra note 67, at 131.
71 See the commentary section of U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5E1.2 cmt.
(2006) ("A fine may be the sole sanction if the [G]uidelines do not require a term of
imprisonment.").
72 We obtained the data from the website of the Inter-University Consortium for Political
and Social Research, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
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105,917 people were sentenced under the Guidelines for white-collar
offenses, which we define as fraud, embezzlement, forgery/counterfeiting,
bribery, tax offenses, and money laundering.73 We forgo examining later
cases because of the increased prominence of white collar crimes after
2001, the introduction of the Feeney Amendment in 2003, and Booker.
Eliminating those for whom necessary variables (age, race, fine
amount, prison sentence, etc.) were missing reduced the sample by about
9,000 offenders for a total of 97,208. When we refer to the "full sample"
this culled data is the number we mean. The culled data are quite detailed,
and include the offenders' education, race, exact sentencing grid position,
offense level, and criminal history. The Office of Policy Analysis only
collected income data between 1991-92 and 1993-94. Income data is still
collected by probation officers and included in the Pre-Sentencing Reports
("PSRs") given to the sentencing judge, but after 1994 the Office of Policy
Analysis dropped the income variable as too unreliable. Thus, when
income is used in our analysis, the sample size is reduced from 97,208 to
22,208.
Table 1 presents the means and percentages of descriptive variables in
the sample. When means are reported, the standard error is included below
the mean in parentheses. The first thing to note is that non-whites make up
roughly 45% of the sample. This is sufficient representation to allow us to
identify any disparities between different ethnic groups. In addition, only
57% of those convicted receive prison time, and 24% receive downward
departures from the Guidelines.
Nearly 94% of the cases were resolved in plea bargains. The use of
pleas is important to any interpretation regarding where racial discrepancies
originate. Bias can enter the system at the judicial level or via the
to
prosecutors, who have a great deal of discretion regarding what cases
74
bring, the level of the offense, and what to agree to in a plea bargain.
B. THE METHODOLOGY
Three different measures are
punishment: length of sentence in
imposed, and whether a downward
of prison sentence is the dependent
73

used to estimate the severity of the
months, whether any prison time was
departure was made. When the length
variable, the equation is estimated as a

We are therefore adhering to the definition of white-collar crime offered by Herbert

Edelhertz: "[A white-collar crime is] an illegal act or series of illegal acts committed by

nonphysical means and by concealment or guile, to obtain money or property, or to obtain
business or personal advantage."

HERBERT EDELHERTZ, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE

NATURE, IMPACT AND PROSECUTION OF WHITE COLLAR CRIME 3 (1970).
74 See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 3, at 105.
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tobit because 42% of the sample received a prison sentence of zero months.
The estimated equation takes the form:
Equation 1:

(1)Sentenceijt = aRaceijt + 7rXijt + 0Guidelineijt + 6Districtj, + P3Termt +
coOfftypeijt + flTrialTypeijt +

6

ijt

Here, i indexes individual, j indexes district, and t indexes judicial
term. Epsilon (E) is the error term. Race is a vector of racial dummy
variables (white being the excluded category); X is a vector of demographic
characteristics including age, education, sex, citizenship status, and the
number of dependents.
Guideline is a matrix of dummy variables
indicating where precisely the convict falls in the sentencing grid. Thus,
there is a dummy variable for each box of the grid (following Mustard's
approach). This technique should control simultaneously for offense level,
criminal history, and any offense level adjustments. District is a matrix of
dummy variables for judicial district (e.g., the Southern District of New
York, the Eastern District of Texas) and Term is a matrix of dummy
variables for judicial term. Offtype is a matrix of dummy variables
accounting for the offense type (e.g., fraud versus tax). TrialType are
dummy variables accounting for whether there is a plea, jury or bench trial,
with plea being the excluded category. Restitution is required under the
Guidelines when possible and is entered as a quadratic. It may influence
the amount of the fine paid and also helps control for the severity of the
offense (the amount of restitution is positively correlated with prison
sentence).
Table 1
Means and Proportions(StandardErrorsin Parentheses)
Variable
Total Prison Sentence

Mean or Proportion
11.34 (21.32)

Prison Time Given

58 %

Sentence Within Range

76%

Downward Departure

24%.

Downward Departure (Substantial Assistance)

14 %

Downward Departure (Judge Initiated)

8 %

Upward Departure

.88 %

Age
Male

Female

38.52 (11.99)
64%
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Table 1 (continued)
Means andProportions(StandardErrors in Parentheses)
Variable

Mean or Proportion

54%

White
Black
Hispanic
Asian
Other
Citizen

88%

Jury

6%

Bench

.098 %

Less than High School

29%

High School

55 %

College

12%

Advanced Degree
No Dependents
One Dependent

21 %

Two Dependents

18%

Three or more Dep.

23 %
97,208

Next, we used a probit specification on whether or not a prison
sentence was imposed. Probits are used when the dependent variable takes
on zero or one, and they allow us to measure how various traits affect the
probability of observing the punishment.
Equation 2:
(2)Pr(Any Prisjt) = pNoPrisPossjt, + aRaceijt + 7rXij, + OGuidelineijt +

6Districtjt + P3Termt + woOfftypeijt + /3TrialTypeijt +
8ijt

Any Pris takes on the value 1 when a positive prison sentence was
imposed and zero otherwise. The other variables remain as before, with the
addition of NoPrisPoss,which is a dummy variable taking on the value 1 if
the Guidelines permit a prison sentence of zero months, and 0 otherwise.
All coefficients are reported as marginal effects, taking the other variables
at their means.

MAX SCHANZENBACH & MICHAEL L. YAEGER

[Vol. 96

Finally, downward departures are considered:

Equation 3:
(3)Pr(DownwrdDeptijt) = aRaceijt + 7tXijt + OGuidelineijt + 6Districtjt +
P3Termt + coOfftypeijt + flTrialTypeijt + Eijt
Downwrd Dept takes on I if the judge imposes a sentence less than the
Guidelines recommend and 0 otherwise. The sample excludes cases in
which downward departure is impossible (because the Guidelines already
permit a sentence of no prison time).
C. THE IDENTIFICATION AND INTERPRETATION OF UNEXPLAINED
RACIAL DISPARITIES
The coefficients on racial dummy variables must be interpreted
cautiously. Unobservable factors that are correlated with race and the
dependent variable (sentence length) can cause a racial dummy variable to
be statistically significant even if there is no "true" discrimination. If those
unobservable factors are legally relevant considerations in sentencing, such
as unaccounted victim harm or the dangerousness of the convict then "true"
racial bias in sentencing may not exist.
The economics literature gives one a flavor of the difficulty in linking
racial disparities to discrimination or a particular form of discrimination.
Large wage disparities are found between blacks and whites. Wage
disparities, albeit much smaller in magnitude, are also found between white
ethnic groups.7 5 Discrimination between white ethnic groups is a dubious
explanation for these disparities. In addition, whether or not wage
disparities between blacks and whites are the result of bias in the labor
market, or earlier discrimination in schooling, health care, and other human
76
capital investments is controversial and difficult to identify empirically.
Racial disparities in hiring are easier to trace because they are open to
randomized experiments. For example, a recent study using traditionally
black names on applications and race neutral names on others (but with
equivalent credentials) found that applicants with black names were much
less likely to receive an interview. 7 This is strong evidence of racial bias in

75

For a recent treatment, see George J. Borjas, Ethnicity, Neighborhoods, and Human

Capital Externalities, 85 AM. EcoN. REV. 365 (1995).
76

For a recent discussion, see Pedro Cameiro et al., Labor Market Discriminationand

Racial Differences in PremarketFactors,48 J.L. & EcON. 1 (2005).
77

Marianne Bertrand & Senhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Brendan More Employable

than Latoya and Tyrone? Evidence on Racial Discriminationin the Labor Market from a
Large Randomized Experiment, 94 AM. ECON. REv. 991 (2004).
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the labor market, but unfortunately we cannot employ a similar
methodology when it comes to sentencing.
Another example of the problem of interpreting racial disparities
comes from examinations of the mortgage market. A number of studies
have found that blacks are more likely than similarly situated whites to be
rejected for home loans.78 A widely noted contradiction, however, is that
blacks are actually slightly more likely to default on home loans. If blacks
truly faced greater hurdles in borrowing due to discrimination, then,
presumably, only blacks that were especially low credit risks would be lent
money, thereby producing a lower default rate for black borrowers. 79 How
can these disparate results be explained? The seeming contradiction is
actually consistent with at least two different interpretations. The first is
that there are some characteristics that are correlated with race yet which
independently contribute to loan risk, and the bank observes these
characteristics but the econometrician does not.
The bank is not
discriminating on the basis of race in this scenario. Another possibility,
however, is that lenders observe what the econometrician observes but
engage in "rational discrimination," meaning that they have an idea of
which unobserved risk factors are correlated with race, but cannot observe
them directly, and so they consciously take account of race in order to avoid
these unobservable factors.8 0
The point of this discussion is simply to emphasize that the source of
racial biases must be investigated very carefully and all possible
interpretations of the outcomes considered. Independent factors correlated
with race must somehow be ruled out.
V.

THE RESULTS

Table 2 begins the analysis by presenting raw averages by race for
some relevant variables. However, these are unadjusted averages that do
not control for a variety of factors such as offense level, criminal history
and crime category. They are merely taken as a starting point for the
discussion.

78 See, e.g., Alicia Mundell et al., Mortgage Lending in Boston: Interpreting HMDA
Data, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 25 (1996).
79 See Helen Ladd, Evidence on Discriminationin Mortgage Lending, 12 J. ECON. PERSP.

41(1998).
80 For an excellent treatment of the difficulty in identifying the source of a racial
disparity, see IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? 45-87 (2001).
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Table 2
Variables by Race and Fine Status
White
Black
Average Prison Sentence
11.47
10.28

[Vol. 96

Hispanic
12.83

(20.08)

(19.29)

(22.42)

Average Prison Sentence
(if fined)

8.09
(18.56)

7.16
(16.98)

12.09
(24.02)

Average Prison Sentence
(if not fined)

12.67
(21.14)

10.85
(19.16)

13.08
(21.09)

Downward Departures

27%

18%

25%

Prison Time

57%

55%

61%

Income<10K

31%

52%

47%

Income between 10K and 20K

23%

26%

26%

Income between 20K and 35K

16%

11%

13%

lncome>35K

30%

9%

14%

Any Fine Paid

26%

16%

19%

Amount of Fine
(if any)

$10,793
(38,266)

$2,850
(11,547)

$6,522
(27,062)

N

62,322

28,077

10,049

On average, prison sentences for all groups in the sample are low:
between 10 and 13 months. No sizeable racial disparities are evident based
on the raw data. Blacks in the sample have lower average prison sentences
than whites and are no more likely to be incarcerated. They are much less
likely to be granted downward departures, however, and this difference was
significant at less than the 1% level. Hispanics receive longer average
prison sentences than whites (1.36 months longer), but are given prison
time and downward departures at a comparable rate.
The starkest finding is that prison time is less for those who pay a fine
versus those who pay no fine, and these differences are all statistically
significant at the 1% level. We do not formally consider the effect of fines
on prison time, as other studies have, but these averages provide some
evidence that the amount of prison time is in part determined by the fine.
The income data, a subset of the full data, are provided for comparison
purposes. Although whites in the sample are clearly wealthier as a group
than blacks and Hispanics in the sample, all offenders in the sample tend to
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have low incomes irrespective of their race. For example, 70% of whites
make less than $35,000 per year, and only 46% of whites make more than

$20,000 per year.
A. DISPARITIES BY DEMOGRAPHIC GROUP: DEPENDENTS,
EDUCATION, AGE, U.S. CITIZENSHIP, FEMALE SEX, AND BEING
WHITE ASSOCIATED WITH LOWER PRISON TERM
Table 3 presents tobit estimates of Equation 1. In each of these
regressions, the dependent variable is total prison sentence in months.

Tobits are run to account for the large number of zero prison sentences.
The sample is subdivided in a number of ways: first, the full sample is used,
then the sample is divided between fine payers and non-fine payers, and
then we reestimate Equation 1 using the income sample. Finally, we
consider the effect of controlling for base offense level instead of final
offense level on the estimated race and sex disparities.
Table 3
Tobits on Total Prison Sentence
6 Base
Level

4 Income
Sample

5 Income
Sample

1.83***
(.38)

1.43***
(.23)

.93**
(.23)

-2.00***
(.19)

.63***
(.23)

2.36***
(.53)

1.74***
(.61)

1.37**
(.60)

-.
87***
(.31)

-.58"
(.30)

-.64*
(.34)

.054
(1.28)

1.26
(.82)

1.05*
(.54)

-1.82***
(.54)

Other

.33
(.54)

.072
(.59)

-.
43
(1.41)

.72
(1.72)

.089
(1.07)

Citizen

-4.40***
(.19)

-4.568***
(.20)

-3.05***
(.46)

-3.72***
(.51)

-3.00***
(.51 )

-4.30***
(.51)

Male

2.72***
(.13)

2.84***
(.14)

3.06***
(.39)

3.98**
(.36)

4.18***
(.35)

6.22***
(.19)

Age

.29***
(.029)

.27***
(.032)

.36***
(.071)

.47***
(.083)

.58***
(.079)

.80***
(.042)

Age Squared/
100

-.42***
(.032)

-.39***
(.042)

-.40***
(.082)

-. 64***
(.091)

-. 72***
(.091)

-.87***
(.041)

Restitution/
10000

.53***
(.043)

.047***
(.0027)

.74***
(.089)

.13***
(.0080)

.12***
(.0080)

.24***
(.0037)

-. 59xe-7***
(.44e-9)

-.51xc-8***
(.72e-9)

-. 15e-8***
(.13e-9)

-. 15c-8***
(.13e-9)

-.15e-8***
(.13e-9)

1 Full
Sample

2 No Fine

Black

.98***
(.13)

.63***
(.14)

Hispanic

1.11
***
(.21)

Asian

Variable

3 Fine
Payers

Controls

Restitution
Squared/10000

-.98xe-8**
(.92e-9)

-1.36*
(.77)
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Table 3 (continued)
Tobits on Total Prison Sentence
Variable

I Full
Sample

2 No Fine

3 Fine
Payers

4 Income
Sample

5 Income
Sample

lncome<1OK

6.19**
(.41)

Income
between IOK
and 20K

1.19***
(.43)

Income
between 20K
and 35K

1.25**
(.63)

6 Base
Level
Controls

No Dependents

1.38***
(.19)

1.40***
(.35)

1.11"**
(.35)

1.48"**
(.51)

.38
(.50)

.95***
(.28)

One Dependent

.51*
(.21)

.67*
(.37)

.28
(.51)

.22
(.51)

-.012
(.53)

.29
(.30)

-. 71
(.54)

-. 14
(.30)

-. 29
(.56)

-48
(.32)

Two
Dependents
Three
Dependents

-.26
(.22)

-. 19
(.25)

High School

-1.39***
(.13)

-1.20***
(.13)

-1.61"**
(.34)

-.94***
(.34)

-. 38
(.35)

.10
(.18)

College

-1.82***
(.19)

-1.41***
(.22)

-2.39"**
(.45)

-1.68***
(.43)

-.79*
(.48)

1.39**
(.28)

Advanced

-1.74***
(.27)

-1.44***
(.31)

-1.83***
(.56)

.83
(.68)

-1.53**
(.67)

2.53**
(.39)

Trial

9.53***
(.22)

9.14***
(.38)

12.31***
(.47)

14.45***
(.53)

14.47***
(.52)

14.47***
(.52)

Sample Size

97,208

75,138

22,070

22,208

22,208

96,556

Standard errors in parentheses. Total Prison Sentence in months is the dependent
variable. All regressions include dummy variables for sentencing grid position,
offense type, judicial term, and district.
*Coefficient statistically significant at the 10% level.
**Coefficient statistically significant at the 5% level.
***Coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level.
Column 1 in Table 3 estimates Equation 1 using the full sample. A
number of legally irrelevant or discouraged factors are correlated with the
length of the sentence, even after accounting for the offender's position in
the sentencing grid, type of offense, district court, and judicial term.
Having more dependents, higher levels of education, being older, U.S.
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citizenship, being female, and being white are all associated with lower
prison terms. For example, having no dependants (versus having three or
more) is associated with a 1.38 month longer prison sentence. Having a
high school education (versus failure to graduate) is associated with a 1.39
month shorter prison sentence. 8 1 Age is positively, though decreasingly,
associated with a longer prison sentence. Citizens receive sentences on
average 4.40 months shorter than non-citizens. As is commonly found in
the sentencing disparity literature, a large unexplained sex disparity exists
(and remains quite large regardless of specification). The point estimate in
column 1 implies that men receive a prison sentence of an average 2.72
months longer than women.
Finally, there are unexplained differentials based on race and ethnicity.
The point estimates imply that blacks receive roughly .98 months and
Hispanics 1.11 months longer sentences on average than whites after
accounting for all observable variables. This corresponds to roughly a 10%
longer prison sentence than average. The magnitude of this disparity is not
huge, but that it persists under the Guidelines is troubling. In addition, it
corresponds in magnitude to estimated disparities in the case of more
serious crimes, such as drug crimes. 82 Having established the existence of a
racial disparity under a typical regression specification, we examine how
sensitive the racial disparities to alternate specifications.
B. THE EFFECT OF FINES: PAYING TO GET OUT OF PRISON
Because judges have broad discretion over fines, we do not incorporate
them directly into the analysis. As discussed, fines are likely endogenous.
In other words, they are determined by the judge simultaneously with the
amount of prison time and each element of the total sentence, fine and
prison time, has an influence on the other. However, we have strong
reasons, a priori, to suspect that fines reduce prison time and that the ability
to pay a fine is correlated with race. Thus, we divide the sample into those
who paid fines and those who paid no fine and consider the estimated racial
disparities within the two groups. If our hypothesis is correct, the estimated
racial disparity among those who pay a fine should be larger than the
estimated racial disparity among those who do not pay a fine.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 3 split the sample into those who paid no
fines (Column 2) and those who paid a fine (Column 3). Among those who
paid no fine, both blacks and Hispanics have .63 months longer prison
81

Those with less than a high school education are the excluded category in the

education dummy variables.
82 See Schanzenbach & Tiller, supra note 56, tbl.3.
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sentences than whites, which are roughly two-thirds of the corresponding
estimates in column 1 and represent only a 5% disparity compared to the
average sentence. When racial disparities are estimated using the finepaying sample, the estimated disparities are much larger for blacks and
Hispanics. For blacks, the disparity is 1.83 months among fine payers
versus .63 months among non-payers. Likewise, for Hispanics, the
disparity is 2.36 months among fine payers versus .63 months among nonpayers. Because the average prison sentence if fined is only eight months,
the racial disparities estimated here are nearly 25% relative to the average
sentence, a substantial relative and absolute increase. In sum, racial
disparities are three to four times larger among fine payers than non-payers,
and roughly one-third of the overall disparity among the races estimated in
Column 1 is due to disparities between fine payers.
We do not interpret the larger racial disparity estimated in the finepaying sample as evidence that those who pay fines face more
discrimination. Instead, we interpret our result as evidence that whites who
pay fines get out of more prison time than blacks and Hispanics who pay
fines. This is likely because the more one pays, the more time is forgiven,
and blacks and Hispanics tend to pay less than whites. A back-of-theenvelope calculation makes this clearer. According to Table 2, blacks who
paid fines paid $8,000 less than whites who paid fines. If we ascribe all of
the racial disparity among fine payers-all 1.83 months-to the extra fines
paid by whites, then a white collar offender can buy out prison time at
$4,371 per month.
Admittedly, this quick estimate most likely goes too far. We believe it
is incorrect to ascribe the racial disparity among fine payers entirely fines.
After all, a disparity exists (albeit much smaller) among those who did not.
Nonetheless, it demonstrates that sentencing is a complicated process, and
the size of the racial disparity can swing widely between different subsamples. In addition, the increase in the disparity between sub samples is
potentially explainable by factors other than judicial prejudice. This is not
to say that the increase in the disparity is no cause for concern. That would
depend on whether one thinks that the fines traded in lieu of prison are
adequate and whether we could be certain that judges are charging the same
"price" across racial groups, something we are not able to discern.
C. THE EFFECT OF INCOME: MORE MONEY, LESS PRISON TIME
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 limit the sample to the three years for
which income data were collected. Column 4 is provided as a means of
comparison for Column 5, and does not include income controls. As can be
seen, the estimated racial disparities are a higher for the income sub sample.
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The coefficient on the dummy variable for less than $10,000 of income
in Column 6 is significant at less than the .0001 level and implies that those
in this income level receive sentences roughly six months longer than those
in the excluded ($35,000 or more) category. We presume that some of this
difference arises because income determines what quality of legal services
the defendant retains and perhaps the greater ability to trade fines for prison
time. The socio-economic status of the defendant is undoubtedly proxied
by income as well. This effect rapidly decreases for our higher income
categories to 1.19 months for $10,000 to $20,000 of income and 1.25
months for $20,000 to $35,000.
More important for our purposes is the effect of income controls, even
crude ones, on the estimated racial disparities. The inclusion of income in
Column 5 reduces the coefficients on the Black and Hispanic dummy
variables by roughly one-third. Thus, income differences may explain up to
one-third of the estimated disparity. More accurate measures of income or
assets would undoubtedly reduce this further. As noted above, we have
reason to believe that income is poorly measured. First, a sizeable portion
of the sample (37%) reports little or no income. This is strange, considering
that the nature of the crimes reported here (embezzlement, fraud, larceny,
tax offenses) almost require higher income levels and a position of
responsibility. Second, apart from any oddities of the actual data collected,
we know that offenders have incentives to underreport income and assets.
Underreporting is a way to avoid paying fines and restitution, and sizeable
income and assets may be evidence of an offender's degree of wrongdoing.
D. THE OFFENSE LEVEL CALCULATIONS
Column 6 of Table 3 conditions sentences on base offense level
instead of final offense level. As discussed, judges have some discretion
over the calculation of the final offense level. It is possible that biases and
prejudices could be masked or reflected in its calculation.
Thus,
conditioning on the final offense level could potentially understate the
biases reflected in race and sex disparities. For example, biased judges
could be more willing to find that a Hispanic man played an aggravating
role than a white woman, which increases the offense level and hence the
sentencing range. Adjustments to the base offense level are generally
reviewed deferentially because they are highly fact-bound. Previous
empirical work indicates that judges exercise a substantial degree of
discretion in these areas.83 Conditioning on this increased offense level
could then understate the scope of an unwarranted disparity.

83

Id.
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On the other hand, the base offense level is an incomplete
measurement of the severity of the crime. For example, the offense level is
enhanced in the case of fraud to account for the size of the loss, whether a
banking institution was affected, or whether sophisticated means were used.
Thus, some disparities between sentences at the base offense level are
justified because they may disappear once various aspects of the different
offenders' conduct are accounted for.
Column 6 of Table 3 reveals that, when sentences are conditioned on
base offense level, blacks and Hispanics actually receive shorter sentences
than whites. In other words, when sentences are compared without
accounting for before judicial discretion, blacks and Hispanics receive
shorter sentences relative to whites. After adjustments are made-after
judicial discretion is accounted for-blacks and Hispanics receive longer
This means that when sentences are
sentences relative to whites.
conditioned on base offense level, our findings regarding race and ethnicity
are actually reversed. For blacks, sentences are two months shorter, and for
Hispanics, sentences are .87 months shorter. Our findings regarding sex,
however, are similar even when sentences are conditioned on base offense
level; men continue to receive longer sentences relative to women. In fact,
the coefficient on the sex dummy variable doubles in size relative to
column 1, rising from under three months to over six months.
Table 4 takes on the offense level calculation directly and the findings
are consistent with those of Table 3's column 6. First, blacks and Hispanics
have lower calculated offense levels-blacks by .90 levels and Hispanics by
.61 levels. For most crimes in our sample, this would reduce the minimum
Guideline prison sentence by roughly two months. Thus, it is not surprising
that conditioning on base offense level versus final offense level in the
prison sentence regressions changes the results significantly. Also note that
men have higher calculated offense levels and whether or not a fine was
paid has no influence on the estimated race and sex disparities.
Table 4
OLS Regressions on FinalOffense Level
90 **
-.
(.029)

2 No Fine
8 *
-.
(.029)

3 Fine Payers
-1.01***

Hispanic

-.61***
(.041)

-.65***
(.051)

-.59***
(.096)

Asian

-.42***
(.062)

-.22***
(.073)

-.43***
(.13)

Variable
Black

Other

1 Full Sample

.4**1**
(.11)

(.11)

(.056)

26
-.
(.23)
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Table 4 (continued)
OLS Regressions on Final Offense Level
1 Full Sample

2 No Fine

3 Fine Payers

Citizen

-.20***
(.045)

.11***
(.046)

.44***
(.084)

Male

.68***
(.027)

.78***
(.029)

.65***
(.057)

Age

.13***
(.009)

10"**
(.009)

16***
(.011)

Age Squared/100

-. 11***

-.078***

(.016)

(.012)

(.013)

Restitution/10000

.55***
(.043)

.53***
(.0043)

.63***
(.014)

-.61xe-7***
(.94e-9)

-.57xe-7***
(.94e-9)

-.76xe-7***
(.26e-9)

No Dependents

-.082*
(.042)

071 *
-.
(.046)

-.013
(.079)

One Dependent

-.005
(.045)

.012
(.049)

.083
(.084)

Two Dependents

-.011
(.045)

.022
(.048)

.11
(.084)

Three Dependents

-.0075
(.048)

.064
(.053)

.14
(.089)

High School

.41***
(.027)

.52***
(.029)

.45***
(.027)

College

.88***
(.042)

1.11 **
(.047)

.91 **
(.079)

Advanced

1.16***
(.072)

1.41***
(.072)

1.20***
(.11)

Trial

3.80***

3.79***

3.45***

(.052)

(.052)

(.092)

96,522

74,837

22,070

Variable

Restitution Squared/10000

Sample Size

-.15**

Standard errors in parentheses. Total Prison Sentence in months is the dependent
variable. All regressions include dummy variables for sentencing grid position,
offense type, judicial term, and district.
*Coefficient statistically significant at the 10% level.
*Coefficient statistically significant at the 5% level.
***Coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level.
What should one make of this? The case of the sex disparity is easy
because the sex disparities work against men in both cases: men have
higher calculated final offense levels and higher prison sentences
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conditional on the final offense level. In the case of racial disparities,
however, the interpretation becomes tricky because the racial disparities
work in opposite directions: minorities have lower calculated final offense
levels but, conditional on the final offense level, higher prison terms. It is
possible that whites commit larger and more complicated frauds on average,
requiring higher calculated offense levels, and hence conditioning on the
base offense level instead of the final offense level omits important
independent variables. However, the size of the fraud should be controlled
for based on the amount of restitution ordered, which we include as an
independent variable. Estimates controlling for total loss due to the fraud,
which was a variable collected in some years, while not reported, yielded
similar results. Interestingly, the payment of a fine, in the case of final
offense levels (see Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4), does not affect the size of
the disparity by much. This stands in contrast to the prison sentence results.
However, these disparities 84are now working in favor of non-whites, so the
results are not inconsistent.
On balance, we suspect that much of the reversal here is due to omitted
variable bias given the inadequacy of the base offense controls, and relevant
sentencing factors such as sophistication of a fraud may well be correlated
with race. This, however, is only an educated guess. We would suspect
similar factors to be at work in the sex disparity, which, contrary to the race
results, increased.
E. INCARCERATION AND DOWNWARD DEPARTURES
Mainly for comparison purposes, Tables 5 and 6 perform probits on
whether a prison sentence was imposed and whether a downward departure
from the Guidelines was made. In Tables 5 and 6, just as in Table 3, large
racial disparities are estimated, and racial disparities are greater among
those who paid fines.
The prison probit results in Table 5 (Y= I if there is some prison time
imposed, 0 otherwise) parallel the results using total prison sentence in
months as the dependent variable. The reported coefficients should be
interpreted as the increase in the proportion going to prison based on being
black, Hispanic, etc. relative to those who are white. In Column 1, for
example, the coefficient on the black dummy is .035, suggesting that 3.5
percentage points more blacks go to prison than observationally equivalent

We acknowledge the possibility that prosecutorial discretion leaves whites with lower
level offenses to slip past while minorities do not. This would cause the average adjustment
for whites to be larger than the average adjustment for minorities, which could explain the
result.
84
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whites. Given that 55% of the sample are not sentenced to any prison time,
this represents a slight disparity. As in the case of prison sentences,
however, the disparities for fine payers are much larger than disparities
among non-payers. For example, for non-payers the black-white disparity
is 2.2 percentage points versus 4.7 percentage points for fine payers.
Table 6 performs a probit analysis on downward departures (Y=1 if
there is a downward departure, 0 otherwise). The sample is limited in two
important ways. First, all substantial assistance departures are removed.
Such departures must be requested by the prosecution, and cannot be
unilaterally granted by the judge. Second, we exclude all cases in which no
prison time was a possibility because it was in the Guideline range or
available as an alternative sentence (this excludes cases in the A and B
range of the sentencing table).
As in the case of the prison probits, sizeable disparities are estimated,
and these disparities are much larger within the group that paid a fine than
within the group that did not. In the case of blacks, the disparity for fine
payers is nearly twice as large, and in the case of Hispanics it is nearly five
times as large.

Table 5
Probit on Prison (Y=1 if Prison imposed, 0 otherwise)
1
Full Sample

2
No Fine

3
Fine Payers

Guidelines Permit no
Prison

-.26***
(.018)

-.26***
(.012)

21**
(.028)

Black

.035***
(.005)

.022***
(.024)

.047***
(.012)

Hispanic

.064***
(.007)

.058***
(.008)

.071***
(.017)

Asian

-.018*
(.011)

-.021 *
(.012)

.003
(.019)

Other

-.
023
(.019)

.014
(.019)

-.
012
(.041)

Citizen

-.19***
(.005)

-.
20***
(.006)

-.11***
(.015)

Male

.10 **
(.004)

.10**
(.021)

.091***
(.010)

Age

.007***
(.001)

.007***
(.001)

.009***
(.002)

Age Squared/100

-. 012"**

-. 012"***

(.001)

(.0013)

-.013"***
(.0029)
(.0029)

Variable

(.001)

(.0013)
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Table 5 (continued)
Probiton Prison (Y=1 if Prison imposed, 0 otherwise)
1
Full Sample

2
No Fine

3
Fine Payers

No Depende nts

.048***
(.007)

.050***
(.008)

.023
(.014)

One Depend ent

.019**
(.007)

.024***
(.007)

.004
(.015)

Two Depen dents

.005
(.007)

.013
(.008)

-.023
(.015)

Three Depe ndents

-.0007
(.008)

-.006
(.008)

-.019
(.016)

High School

-.
052***
(.005)

-.
042***
(.005)

-.033*
(.001)

College

078***
-.
(.007)

-.
065***
(.008)

-.
046***
(.012)

-.
035***
(.012)

-.
023
(.017)

Trial

.25***
(.007)

.21"***
(.048)

.34***

Sample Size

97,095

74,937

21,971

Variable

Advanced

-.059***
(.013)

(.019)

Standard errors (the numbers in parentheses) are Huber-White robust estimates.
Total Prison Sentence in months is the dependent variable. All regressions include
dummy variables for sentencing grid position, offense type, judicial term, and
district. Coefficients reflect marginal effects.
*Coefficient statistically significant at the 10% level.
**Coefficient statistically significant at the 5% level.
***Coefficient statistically significant at the 1%level.

Table 6
Probiton Downward Departurefrom Guidelines (Y=I if downward
departure,0 otherwise)
1
Full Sample

4
No Fine

5
Fine Payers

Black

-.041***
(.004)

-.
037**
(.008)

-.
071***
(.013)

Hispanic

-.022***
(.007)

-.013*
(.007)

-.065***
(.016)

Asian

-.039***
(.009)

-.016
(.011)

-.074**
(.021)

Variable
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Table 6 (continued)
Probiton Downward Departurefrom Guidelines (Y=I if downward
departure, 0 otherwise)
1
Full Sample

4
No Fine

5
Fine Payers

Other

-.
032*
(.017)

-.042***
(.017)

.029
(.057)

Citizen

.029***
(.006)

.031***
(.006)

-.003
(.019)

Male

-.083***
(.005)

-.077***
(.006)

-.
098***
(.018)

Age

-.008***
(.001)

-.006***
(.001)

-.
016**
(.002)

Age Squared/100

.011"**
(.001)

.011"**
(.001)

.022***
(.003)

No Dependents

-.041***
(.006)

-.031***
(.007)

-.
049***
(.017)

One Dependent

-.022***
(.007)

-.019***
(.007)

-.031**
(.017)

Two Dependents

-.005
(.007)

-.005
(.007)

-.024
(.019)

Three Dependents

-.003
(.008)

-.013*
(.008)

.019
(.021)

High School

.015**
(.004)

.012**
(.0049)

.039***
(.013)

College

.038***
(.007)

.034***
(.007)

.067**
(.018)

Advanced

.029**
(.009)

.023**
(.011)

.055**
(.022)

-.064***
(.006)

-.028***
(.0066)

-.
10***
(.011)

41,822

35,237

6,515

Variable

Trial
Sample Size

Standard errors (the numbers in parentheses) are Huber-White robust estimates.
Total Prison Sentence in months is the dependent variable. All regressions include
dummy variables for sentencing grid position, offense type, judicial term, and
district. Coefficients reflect marginal effects.
*Coefficient statistically significant at the 10% level.
**Coefficient statistically significant at the 5% level.
***Coefficient statistically significant at the 1% level.
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F. COMPARISONS TO PAST STUDIES
In many respects our results are consistent with past studies of whitecollar crime.
Like Mustard, who examined fraud cases under the
Guidelines as part of his broad study, and Michael Benson and Esteban
Walker, who examined pre-Guidelines white-collar crime cases in a single
federal district court, we find that in white-collar cases, when sentences are
conditioned on final offense levels, nonwhites were both more likely to be
incarcerated and more likely to receive longer sentences than whites. s5 Like
Waldfogel, we find evidence suggesting that defendants are able to trade
fines for reductions in prison time.
In some respects, however, our results diverge dramatically from the
last book in the series of Yale Studies, Weisburd et al.'s Crimes of the
Middle Classes, which examined federal white-collar crime sentences
meted out between 1976 and 1978 (roughly ten years before the Guidelines
took effect). When we condition sentences according to final offense
levels, we find that blacks and Hispanics are both more likely to be
incarcerated and more likely to receive long sentences relative to whites.
When we condition sentences according to base offense levels, thereby
eliminating the effect of adjustments, we find that the results flip; blacks
and Hispanics are less likely to be incarcerated and more likely to receive
shorter sentences relative to whites. Both techniques revealed disparities,
but opposing ones. In contrast, Weisburd et al.'s pre-Guidelines study
found no statistically significant racial disparity (though the estimated race
coefficient in their prison sentence regression is 12%, roughly in line with
ours). Several possible explanations for these discrepancies between our
study and the Yale Studies come to mind.
First, our sample sizes are different. The Yale Studies use a sample of
1,094 cases; because of the mechanization of data collection under the
Sentencing Commission, we were able to obtain a sample size of 97,208.86
Second, some unobserved aspect of the Guidelines might have created a
disparity where once there was none. This could have happened any
number of ways. To give just one example, the Guidelines might have
altered the "paradox of leniency and severity" identified by one of the

85 See Benson & Walker, supra note 58, at 298-99 ("Contrary to Wheeler et al., we find
that nonwhites are more likely to be incarcerated than their white counterparts.... As with
the In/Out decision, race has a significant effect on the length of sentence: Nonwhite
defendants received longer sentences than white defendants."); Mustard, supra note 42, at
312 ("The differences by race... exist across offense types.... Blacks and males not only
receive longer sentences but also are less likely to receive no prison term when that option is
available.").
86 See supra Part IV.A.
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earlier Yale Studies, Sentencing the White Collar Offender: Rhetoric and
Reality.87 The severity occurs, the study claimed, because judges hold
defendants with high social status to a higher moral standard than other
defendants, and so punish high-status defendants more when they
transgress. The leniency occurs because high social status is usually tied to
what the study calls "impeccability," meaning a record free of previous
criminality and full of magnanimity, and this record supposedly prompts the
judge to be lenient. Together these elements combined to pull judges in
two directions. The severity element is at the fore when judges are deciding
whether to sentence people to prison, and the leniency element is at the fore
when judges are deciding how long a prison term should be.88 According to
the theory, then, high status offenders are imprisoned more than other
offenders, but among those who are imprisoned, they have the shorter
prison terms.
Perhaps the Guidelines altered the paradox for actual sentences,
examined in this study as sentences conditioned on final offense levels, by
taking many in/out decisions, meaning decisions of whether or not to
impose any prison time, away from judges. The severity effect may be less
powerful under the Guidelines because judges have less discretion than
before in choosing whether to sentence offenders to prison, yet the leniency
effect may be just as strong as it was before the Guidelines were enacted.
Given that whites tend to be wealthier and of higher status than blacks and
Hispanics, the attenuation of the severity effect may have created the
disparity in our results. On the other hand, this theory has at least one
major weakness: as a practical matter, judges have retained a great deal of
discretion in white-collar cases. After all, a large portion of the criminals in
our sample (roughly 42% ) fall into "Zone A," the section of the Sentencing
Table in which judges have a choice as to whether to imprison an offender.
Judges also retain a great deal of discretion in meting out fines because the
ranges on the Fine Table are so wide. 89 Still, it may deserve further
consideration.
The Yale Studies' hypothesis of the leniency and severity paradox
might also shed some light on why conditioning sentences on base offense
levels reverses our findings. Perhaps base offense level does not account
for the factors that, pre-Guidelines, the Yale Studies found encouraged
severity against high status defenders. And perhaps final offense level,
which incorporates adjustments for amount of money stolen or leadership
87

See Wheeler et al., Sentencing the White-Collar Offender: Rhetoric andReality, supra

note 58, at 645.
88 See id. at 651, 653.
89 See supra Table 2.
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roles in the offense, etc., does account for the factors that, Pre-Guidelines,
the Yale Studies found encouraged severity. This might explain why
sentences conditioned on base offense level differ so dramatically from
sentences based on final offense level.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

Despite the Sentencing Guidelines' focus on reducing unwarranted
sentencing disparities, unexplained racial and ethnic differentials persist
even for non-violent, white-collar crimes. We find, however, that the
disparities are highly sensitive to sub-samples and to the specification of the
model.
When the dependent variable is the total prison sentence
conditional on the final offense level, the disparities are roughly three times
larger among those offenders who paid a fine. This result is nearly as stark
in the prison and downward departure probits. When income is considered,
the prison sentence disparities decrease by roughly one-third. In addition,
when we condition sentences on base offense levels instead of final offense
levels, the estimated racial disparities actually flip signs. Whites, not blacks
and Hispanics, are on the losing side of the disparity. The sex disparity, on
the other hand, consistently disfavors men.
We conclude that observed racial disparities in prison sentences for
white-collar criminals are due in large part to the ability of different groups
to pay fines and other factors which are often not controlled for or are
poorly controlled for (such as wealth). Paying fines reduces the prison time
imposed, and thus it seems that whites receive shorter sentences, in part,
because they have a disproportionate ability to pay fines. This does not
imply that there are no other sources of racial disparities, however, because
disparities remained even within the group that did not pay a fine.
There are a couple of important policy implications to be drawn from
the analysis. First, if fines are more heavily relied upon, the analysis
suggests that racial disparities in prison sentences, particularly those
between black and whites, might increase. Second, if racial disparities in
white-collar sentences and fines are driven partly by income levels and
unobserved assets, then a more creative system of fining and ascertaining
the ability of offenders to pay fines might actually reduce observed racial
disparities. If fines are made proportionate to wealth and a system of
payment options is created, prison time may be forgiven in a more equitable
fashion.
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Appendix 1
Sentencing Table (in months of imprisonment)90
Offense
Level
1
2
3
Zone
A

Zone
SB
LZone
C

Zone
D

Criminal History Category (Criminal History Points)
V
IV
III
II
I
(10,11,12)
(7.8.9)
(4.5. 6)
(2 or 3)
(0 or 11
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6
J 2-8
0-6
0-6
0-6
0-6

4
5
6

0-6
0-6
0-6

7
8
9
10
11

VI
(13 or more)
0-6
3-7
3-9
6-12
1 9-15
12-18

0-6
0-6
1-7

[-70-624
2-8

2-8
4-10
6-12

0-6
0-6
4-10
6-12
8-14
10-16

2-8
4-10
6-12
1 8-14
10-16
J 12-18

4-10
6-12
1 8-14
10-16
1 12-18
15-21

[12-18
8-14
10-16 .........[15-21
18-24
12-18
21-27
15-21
24-30
18-24
27-33
21-27

15-21
18-24
21-27
24-30
27-33
30-37

13
14
15

12-18

15-21

18-24

24-30

30-37

33-41

15-21
18-24

18-24
21-27

21-27
24-30

27-33
30-37

33-41
37-46

37-46
41-51

16
17
18

21-27
24-30
27-33

24-30
27-33
30-37

27-33
30-37
33-41

33-41
37-46
41-51

41-51
46-57
51-63

46-57
51-63
57-71

19
20
21

30-37
33-41
37-46

33-41
37-46
41-51

37-46
41-51
46-57

46-57
51-63
57-71

57-71
63-78
70-87

63-78
70-87
77-96

22
23
24

41-51
46-57
51-63

46-57
51-63
57-71

51-63
57-71
63-78

63-78
70-87
77-96

77-96
84-105
92-115

84-105
92-115
100-125

25
26
27
28
29
30

57-71
63-78
70-87

63-78
70-87
78-97

70-87
78-97
87-108

84-105
92-115
100-125

100-125
110-137
120-150

110-137
120-150
130-162

78-97
87-108
97-121

87-108
97-121
108-135

97-121
108-135
121-151

110-137
121-151
135-168

130-162
140-175
151-188

140-175
151-188
168-210

31
32
33

108-135
121-151
135-168

121-151
135-168
151-188

135-168
151-188
168-210

151-188
168-210
188-235

168-210
188-235
210-262

188-235
210-262
235-293

34
35
36

151-188
168-210
188-235

168-210
188-235
210-262

188-235
210-262
235-293

210-262
235-293
262-327

235-293
262-327
292-365

262-327
292-365
324-405

37
38
39

210-262
235-293
262-327

235-293
262-327
292-365

262-327
292-365
324-405

292-365
324-405
360-life

324-405
360-life
360-life

360-life
360-life
360-life

40
41
42
43

292-365
324-405
360-life
Life

324-405
360-life
360-life
Life

360-life
360-life
360-life
Life

360-life
360-life
360-life
Life

360-life
360-life
360-life
Life

360-life
360-life
360-life
Life

12

4-10
6-12
1,,5

90 The "zones" mark areas of the Table in which judges have the same amount of discretion.
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